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For many centuries ideas now embodied in graph theory have been implicit m lay discussions 
of networks. The explicit hnking of graph theory and network analysis began only in 1953 and has 
been rediscovered many times since. Analysts have taken from graph theory mainly concepts and 
termmology; Its theorems, though potentially valuable for the analysis of real data, are generally 
neglected. Network analysts thus make too little USC of the theory of graphs. Some instances of the 
uw of theorems for network analysis are noted. 
Boissevain (1979: 394) complains that “if anthropologists and sociol- 
ogists continue to view network analysis as a special field of inquiry, 
and if those who use it continue to encourage this view, it will rapidly 
become overly technical and its results progressively trivial”. Boissevain 
is not alone in making this criticism. A recent conference paper was 
entitled “The unfulfilled promise of network analysis” (Allan 1980) and 
even Bott (1971:323), whose early work on married couples inspired 
many subsequent studies of social networks, warns against the dangers 
of “network-ology - getting lost in classification exercises for the fun 
of it”. There are many critics who point scornfully at the mismatch they 
see between the claims and achievements of network analysts. In this 
short paper we do not discuss these claims (we believe that network 
analysts have usually been considerably more modest than their critics 
allege), nor do we undertake yet another survey of achievements in 
network analysis, a task that becomes more formidable every year. 
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Instead, we argue that one of the reasons why many of the results of 
network analysis are trivial is, contrary to Boissevain’s view, that they 
are insufficiently technical, in that they fail to utilize the analytic power 
latent in graph theory. 
The closeness of the link between network analysis and graph theory 
is widely recognized, but the nature of the link is seldom discussed. 
Graph theory, like all other branches of mathematics, consists of a set 
of interconnected tautologies. The lattice of their interconnections 
provides us, at least in retrospect, with an unproblematic outline for a 
history of the theory (Harary 1969, 1973). Network analysis has no 
analogous lattice of propositional interconnections and its history is 
contestable. Although it can now be defined ostensively by pointing to 
the pages of Social Networks and similar journals, its institutionaliza- 
tion as an accepted specialism is only recent, and no account of its 
origins has yet achieved the status of the orthodox myth. Leinhardt 
(1977) gave his collection of articles on social networks the subtitle “a 
developing paradigm”, and his choice of papers constitutes an attempt 
to define the origin and course of that development. He chose Moreno 
(1934) and Heider (1946). while Heider himself (1979:16) derives his 
own work on balance theory from Spinoza’s Ethics, published in 1677. 
Mitchell (1969) looks back to Radcliffe-Brown ( 1940), while Mayer 
( 1966) cites Chapple and Coon (1942). Whitten and Wolfe (1973) 
invoke Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) and Warner and Lunt (1941). 
What now seems interesting about this pedigree construction is that 
none of these candidate pioneers made use of graph theory. Indeed, we 
may confidently assume that they were unaware of its existence, at least 
at the time they wrote their classic works. 
The language of graphs can be used to model many notions that were 
current long before graph theory was born. The most notable of these 
was the mnemonic of places and images recommended for orators in 
the first century B.C. by Cicero and others (Yates 1966: 17-41) and 
still in use not only in industrialized societies but also among some 
contemporary pre-literate communities (Harwood 1976; Hage 1978). 
The mnemonic is equivalent to specifying a walk, or in Cicero’s case a 
path, containing all the points of a tree (Harary 1969: 13). Graph theory 
took shape only slowly, with a gap of two hundred years between 
Euler’s founding paper of 1736 and K&rig’s definitive monograph of 
1936. In the interim Kirchhoff (1847) and Cayley (1857) developed 
theorems in graph theory and applied them to electrical circuits and 
chemical isomers respectively. 
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The first indisputable application of graph theory to network analy- 
sis did not come until 1953, with Harary and Norman’s short mono- 
graph. Cartwright (1953) attaches the work to a line of descent leading 
from Kurt Lewin ( 1936) and Clark Hull ( 1940) through Bavelas ( 1948). 
With the benefit of hindsight we would argue that this union of graph 
theory and network analysis was one instance, distinguished by its 
comparative subsequent success, of attempts to express, in relatively 
formal terms, customary social arrangements and configurations of 
actual social bonds. Another such attempt was made, probably prema- 
turely and certainly with less success, by Chapple in his contribution to 
the textbook written with Coon, in which he tried to blend two styles of 
analysis, the counting and measuring associated with his interaction 
chronograph (Chapple 1940) and the identification of distinctive un- 
quantified patterns, exemplified in the cryptically designated “set” 
(ChappPe and Coon 1942: 285). Whereas the former derived from the 
statistical tradition in psychology, the latter has strong similarities with 
Lewin’s work. The latter tradition, which has the closer ties to graph 
theory, is also to be seen in Armstrong’s remarkable monograph Rossel 
Island (1928), which contains not only the notion of “tribal distance”, 
equivalent to graph theoretic distance, but also a “General theory of 
the classifactory system of relationships”, in which he presents a 
typology of prescriptive marriage class systems, most of them hypothet- 
ical. This line of thinking was taken further by Layard in an impressive 
discussion, with 3-dimensional diagrams, of hypothetical 12-class sys- 
tems in which he acknowledges help from Gregory Bateson (Layard 
1942: 113). In retrospect it is interesting, particularly in Bateson’s case, 
that these anthropologists appear to have had no contact with mathe- 
maticians on this aspect of their work. 
Most social scientists at that time probably identified mathematics 
with statistics, and in rejecting a statistical mode of analysis they 
assumed that mathematics had no help to offer them. Thus Cartwright 
(1953: iii) contrasts old-style help for social scientists from statisticians 
with new-style help from graph theorists, topologists and the like. 
Similarly Levi-Strauss (1954: 585-586) contrasts quantitative mathe- 
matics with what he calls qualitative mathematics, and describes his 
surprise at discovering in Andre Weil a new type of mathematician 
who, unlike the statisticians, had something relevant to say in the 
analysis of structures. Weil’s (1949) contribution to Levi-Strauss’ mag- 
num opus was perhaps the first explicit attempt to apply combinatorics 
to the analysis of social structure; it wab introduced to Anglophone 
readers by White (1963: 159~~172). 
There is at least one other line of descent that leads to nerwork 
analysis and graph theory, or rather a line in Lvhich both partners in 
this union have, in embryonic form. already been united for t~und~-eds 
of years. Genealogical diagrams are diagrams of graphs. for they 
contain individual persons as nodes, linked by relations of affinity. 
parenthood and siblingship. Diagrams of this kind have been in practi- 
cal use in many parts of the world. and oral descriptions of thcsc 
configurations of relations have been with us for thousands of years 
(Barnes 1967: 103). Yet though the noclal networhn expressed in geneal- 
ogies have been diligently and contentiously anatysed through the ages. 
until Morgan (1 870) there was very little that could be called “theory” 
in this analysis. Once graph theory was seen to have relevance for the 
analysis of social networks, genealogical diagrams. as graphs, became 
an obvious site for applying this theory. The contrast between the 
discussion of graphs in isolation from graph theory, typified by the 
work of Armstrong, Layard and Batcson, and the application of theory 
to these graphs typical of present-day analysis. is shown b> two 
analyses of the “atom of kinship”. L&i-Strauss (1945: 48, 50; 1953: 5: 
cf. 1963: 46. 48. 72). who coined this term to denote the configuration 
of a woman, her brother, her husband and their son. discusses their 
interrelations with half an eye on properties of symmetry and asymme- 
try and with half an eye on the incest taboo. Flament (1963: 12% 126) 
uses the theory of balance in signed graphs to predict the rmpirically 
possible configurations of signed relationships in the L&-Strauss “atom 
of kinship”. To do this, he makes assumptions about the signs of the 
two relations in the configuration that L&i-Strauss ignored. Our under- 
standing of the “atom” is thereby enhanced. The present paper i\ 
presented in the hope that it may elicit further applications of theory to 
data that will be equally rewarding. 
Granovetter ( 1979:501), surveying the literature on network analysis, 
asks “Where is the theoretical underpinning for all these models and 
analyses?” Part of the answer can be easily found in what are often 
referred to disparagingly but unpl-oblernatically as “ verbal theories”, 
but another part of the answer to tiranovetter. which lies in the 
theorems of graph theory, is harder to discern. A survey of some of the 
material published since Granovetter posed his question yields disap- 
pointing results. The concepts of graph theory appear abundantly. 
though they are sometimes named idiosyncratically. Indices defined in 
terms of these concepts are constructed and their values for sets of 
empirical data are calculated and compared. These procedures are 
frequently rewarding and enhance our understanding of the real world. 
In many of these instances graph theory is clearly the most convenient, 
and sometimes the only available, source of analytic tools. A good 
example of analysis at this level is provided by Garbett (1980) who 
makes use of centrality measures and what he calls “graphs of inclu- 
sion” to elucidate the structure of an Indian caste hierarchy. 
On the other hand, relations between graph theoretic concepts, as 
embodied in theorems, are seldom seen in network analysis. They do 
appear sometimes in discussions of analytic methods but are linked 
only rarely to real data sets. Yet as long as network analysts use only 
the concepts and terminology of graph theory while ignoring its theo- 
rems they are open to the charge made by Boissevain (1979: 393): they 
use dynamite to kill flies. The dynamic power of graph theory lies not 
in its terminology but, like any other branch of mathematics, in its 
theorems. 
Graph theory uses two primitive, undefined terms, point and line; 
these two terms are mentioned in a small number of axioms. unproved 
statements assumed to be true. The primitive terms and the axioms 
together constitute the axiom system of graph theory. Its theorems 
consist of statements each of which can be derived logically either 
directly from the axiom system or indirectly by making use of theorems 
that have already been proved. Thus a theorem is tautologically true; it 
tells us nothing about the real world. Yet once it has been discovered it 
can be used with reference to any appropriate mathematical model of 
the real world that has been constructed with material from its axiom 
system. It then reveals real world implications of the model that might 
otherwise have not been noticed or utilized by the designer of the model 
(Harary et ~1. 1965: 334, 24425). 
Among the few papers published recently that use theorems we note 
Seidman and Foster’s ( 1978) discussion of how Menger’s theorem 
might facilitate an analysis of generalized cliques. Capobianco and 
Molluzzo (1980) use theorems about forests to simplify their proof of a 
new theorem about organizational trees and apply their findings to 
imaginary data. By proving and then using a theorem about the balance 
of the signed graph of a marked graph, an algorithm has been con- 
structed for determining whether or not a given signed graph is bal- 
anced (Beineke and Harary 1978; Harary and Kabell 1980), an algo- 
rithm with obvious applications to real data. Maybee ( 198 1) has applied 
somewhat similar notions to test the “sign stability” of causation 
matrices occurring in mathematical economics. 
A theory worth its salt should not only provide retrospective ex- 
planation; it should also generate testable propositions and predictions. 
Predictions put to the test are, alas, even rarer occurrences in the 
literature of network analysis than arc theorems put to use. A good 
example of hypothesis testing, though apparently carried out retrospec- 
tively rather than prospectively, is Zachary’s (1975) study of a karate 
club. By using a capacitated network model and utilizing several 
theorems, he is able to provide a sociologically convincing account of 
how the club split into two. The alignment of club members in the two 
factions conforms to the model in 97 percent of cases. 
In the subtitle of the journal Social Networks the term ‘structural 
analysis’ appears as if it were a synonym for ‘network analysis’. The 
varieties of ‘structuralism’ are legion; adding yet another meaning to an 
all-too-fashionable word makes for confusion rather than clarity. Yet 
the use of ‘structural’ in this context is regrettably appropriate in- 
asmuch as the great majority of examples of network analysis share 
with most other structural analyses the quality of being entirely static. 
Group dynamics may have been one of the antecedents of network 
analysis, but the dynamic characteristics of the former (elusive though 
they sometimes were) have been transformed into a static structuralism. 
An encouraging exception to this generalization is Doreian’s work on 
structural change (1980), applying analytic tools of Atkin (1977) to field 
data collected by Davis and others (1941). 
So far we have discussed the limited use network analysts have made 
of established theorems in graph theory. Seidman and Foster (1978:70) 
make the important point that the intellectual stimuli should flow in 
both directions. The problems encountered in the analysis of network 
data should stimulate what they call ‘ the development of anthropologi- 
cally-motivated mathematics’. The example of factor analysis, a statisti- 
cal technique developed to meet the needs of experimental psycholo- 
gists (Eysenck 1953: 38852), shows that mathematical invention and 
discovery is sometimes stimulated by social science. Maybe network 
analysts will also be successful in stimulating mathematicians to meet 
their special needs, or will manage to do the job elegantly themselves. 
Freeman’s work on centrality (1979; Freeman et al. 1980) can be seen 
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in this light. The example given from psychology shows also how the 
growth of a social science can be distorted when its practitioners 
become dominated not by empirical evidence but by a mathematical 
technique in which they assume a proprietary interest. Network analysts 
should be forewarned against this hazard. 
Few network analysts nowadays would query Seidman and Foster’s 
(1981) comment that “it is useful to regard a social network as a graph, 
thus gaining access to the precise terminology of graph theory”. Regret- 
tably, for many analysts, though not for these two authors, this is 
apparently all that graph theory has to offer. Empirical or imagined 
data are coded into graph theoretic categories, are fed into computers 
making use of specially written programmes, and generate useful results 
that in practice could not have been obtained in any other way. But it 
seems to us as if network analysts are all too often still at the stage of 
children learning the concepts of arithmetic by playing with Cuisinier 
rods; mathematics proper still lies ahead. Even in 1981 it may be true, 
as Levi-Strauss (1954:583) asserted nearly thirty years ago, that “the 
confidence now shown by so many social scientists in mathematical 
models is due not so much to the results they themselves have secured 
by those methods as to the enormous assistance that mathematics has 
provided in other fields, and particularly physics”. Nevertheless, by 
realizing what a short distance we have advanced, we may perhaps be 
enabled to move ahead faster. 
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